It's Hard to Argue with Success

Let's be clear: science works. The fruits of science include airplanes, computers, lasers, cell phones, x-rays, MRIs, men on the moon, and tons of other successes. But the fact that science "works" does not cede the point that while science can predict observable phenomenon, we should be skeptical of what science says about those parts of the world we cannot observe. There are innumerable examples of real-life observable phenomenon being susceptible to more than a single interpretation or theory. Consider again Copernicanism and geocentricism. Both were able to accurately predict the movement of heavenly bodies; in other words, the math worked for both. But the theories differed as to the why; from the ground there was no way of knowing which explanation for the movements was correct, but one of them was wrong.

Stokes provides a list of other instances in which the reasons offered by science for observable phenomenon turned out to be wrong. In the 19th century, for example, aether (or ether) - a substance that existed to transmit electromagnetic or gravitational forces - was "better confirmed than any other theoretical entity in natural philosophy!" Aether theories made startling predictions about observable phenomenon, and yet got it wrong when it came to what goes on behind the scenes. In other words, while aether does not exist, things were discovered and predicted as if it did! Given its track record in the history of science, it seems that we should as least be wary about how much stock we put in current theories - that is, theories that "work" to help make discoveries and predictions based on false assumptions - given the frequency with which theories are overturned. The mechanics of the theories can be correct, but the explanations for those mechanics could be wrong.

So, for example, while modern theories of quantum mechanics and general relativity have been subjected to ridiculously rigorous testing, it could be learned - as with aether theories - that while the science works, theories may not. Consider this: Newtonian physics and Einstein's theories may be able to predict the occurrence of gravity (after all, we went to the moon on these predictions), but their notions of why an object gets pulled to the surface, (e.g., following curved space) may not; no one can see the force. An equally plausible and yet equally unobservable explanation could be that God is individually holding each of us in place, pulling that individual apple down to earth, and allowing each rocket to leave the earth and enter space. Since God is consistent and unchangeable, the predictability of gravity could reflect the consistency of his character acting on the universe. This cannot be disproven. As we mentioned last week, individuals choose explanations that seem most "plausible" given a stunning array of ideas, assumptions, beliefs, and worldviews. To wit: In his book, Grand Design, Stephen Hawking writes that although the Big Bang model of the universe's origin is more useful than the Genesis account, "neither model can be said to be more real than the other."

Stokes concludes the chapter:

...perhaps, given that we can't be sure that our theories tell the truth about unobservable reality, we should rest content with empirical adequacy. That is, maybe we shouldn't insist that a theory tell us the truth about unobservable subatomic particles or gravitational fields, as long as the world behaves as if there are such entities.

Like aether.