Monday, August 19, 2019

Morality Grounded in God or Someone or Something Else?

In this next chapter, Stokes explores how God can be used as a ground for morality. In this post, I don't have the space to discuss Euthyphro's objection from Plato's dialogue or the divine command theory - both discussed expensively in this chapter. The former is based on a question posed by Socrates in response to Euthyphro's assertion that pious acts are those that are loved by the gods. Socrates counters after realizing that this definition is ambiguous: are the acts pious because the gods love them, or do the gods love these acts because these acts or pious? The dilemma is that either moral value depends on God and is therefore arbitrary (i.e., it depends simply on what he likes and dislikes); or else the source of moral value is independent of God entirely. Euthyphro's dilemma challenges the divine command theory which states that morality is based on God's preferences and not on the intrinsic nature of an impersonal cosmos. So, morality is based on God's preferences which are founded on his nature. Since it's based on God' preferences, is God's morality arbitrary? Sort of...one could argue. But God always acts consistently within his character, therefore, morality may be arbitrary (his preferences) but it's not capricious (consistent in his character). Like I mentioned, I can't cover all of this in detail. A Google search will provide plenty of information on the topic. But what Stokes wants to get across is that, in his opinion and among some atheists, there is agreement that morality isn't objective in the sense of being person independent; it's person dependent: God or someone else. And for the former, God's nature determines what is good and good is defined as "what God values."

The next critical question Stokes addresses is, "Why should we obey God?" Why are his preferences more authoritative than human preferences? What is it about God that makes him (relevantly) different from humans? Should we obey him because if we didn't he would punish us? Is it because he created us and so has authority over us? These reasons don't sit well with atheists and a number of Christians. Does might make right? In strictly human relationships, do we owe allegiance to another person simply because that being is stronger or responsible for our existence? Should a child obey an abusive parent just because the parent brought him into the world? The child may obey in order to avoid more physical pain, but is he morally obligated - is it the right thing to do - to obey that parent? I think most of us would respond no to that question. Stokes notes that most theists aren't motivated primarily because God is stronger, nor even because he created them. They obey God because they want to.

Of course, God is God and his authority and power are awesome and, as the ruler of the universe, he can be its lawgiver and can tell us what is permissible and what is not. But this is one reason why atheists find God so distasteful: they see him as an overbearing authoritarian dictator. But theists see God differently. As in a human family, children obey often enough not out of fear of punishment, but because they love their parents, feel loved by them, and are grateful for the care and comfort their parents provide. There's a sense of loyalty and belonging. In a real sense, believers obey God because they want to; and they want to because they value certain things. And God can influence that alignment of values through "regeneration" and "sanctification"; through those processes, God's values become our values. Humans become better humans when they align with God's values and image.

There is certainly more to discuss about how morality can be grounded in God. But a strong argument can be made that God's morality is not capricious; while it reflects his values and preferences, his standards can be known, and they do not change. Subjective, yes, but there are standards: torturing a kitten is always wrong; rape is always wrong; adultery is always wrong. Without God, morality becomes subject to changing human values, preferences, and needs. Why is one human's preferences or one group's preferences more authoritative than another's? We are all equally human. We can't say that rape is always wrong and adultery is always wrong. As a matter of fact, the latter used to be wrong according to social and political human morality, but not anymore. It probably doesn't feel wrong to the adulterers, but it probably seems wrong to the offended spouse. Which preference or value rules the day? Society still holds that rape is wrong, but why? Because the offender will get arrested by the government? If there was no law against rape (like in Nanking during the Japanese invasion of China) would it still be wrong? If so, why is one human preference more authoritative than another? If morality is not independent of humans, then how do we know which of our values and preferences are right? Who is the valuer we ought to obey? Who or what becomes the moral umpire?

These are difficult questions that I'm trying to sort through and make sense of. I know what I believe, but one of the purposes for me reading this book is to try to understand those on the other side. That is, how do they reconcile the problems that I see when I apply sober skepticism to the belief that God does not exist?

Stokes explores some of these questions in the next chapter.

1 comment:

  1. Socrates posed that question about morals (I'm treating 'morals' as a synonym of 'piety') to Euthyphro, but didn't define what morals are.

    Somebody has to, though, so I'll stick my neck out here: the moral code is based on the desirability of building and maintaining good relationships.

    This sounds so obvious when stated this way, but not many people have, perhaps because Western culture is not just Greek but also infusions of Christianity. Christians and Jews alike never discussed morals in abstract ways; the scriptures treat them more concretely. Contrast this with Greeks, who turn everything into an abstraction. Socrates asked Phaedrus, do we need anyone to tell us what's good? Yes, Socrates, we do.

    Without relationships, there's no reason for a moral code. A universe of none obviously needs no moral code. A black hole swallows a star and the other starts don't petition the galaxy to place the black hole under arrest.

    Even a universe of one presents problems. Presumably, if God is eternal, then there was some amount of time t before God made a creature. What need did God have for a moral code during this period? There were no relationships. There were no relationships to harm.

    But now, there are relationships between God and His creatures, and His creatures with each other.

    But if that's all there is, it means the moral code isn't eternal, but temporal: non-existent for years, and maybe again eventually, when no more creatures exist.

    Jesus implied otherwise with phrases like, "Heaven and earth will die, but my words will never die." He speaks as if the moral code is eternal, just like God Himself.

    And the only way that makes sense is if the Christianity notion of the Trinity is real. One God in Three Persons. They are as they have always been through eternity. God's goodness is a reflection of how the Persons of the Trinity treat one another: with great love, respect, and humility. If God had been any less perfect, the Trinity would have split apart eons and eons ago. Two members of the Trinity would plot against the third. There would be betrayals. Backstabbings. False witness. Without perfect love, God would be same as us.

    Euthyphro didn't have to mental tools to deal with Socrates' question. The moral code happens to be what God prefers, but it is not arbitrary. It's always about what is best for loving relationships.

    Yes, sometimes the rules change. Generally, it's wrong to lie. Deceivers are generally condemned in scripture. But it right to lie under certain circumstances.

    I just read an article about an American sergeant in World War II, a POW, in charge of other enlisted POWs. The German officers told them to separate the Jews out from the non-Jews. The sergeant, with a pistol held to his head, calmly informed the Germans, "We are all Jews." The war had three months to go, and mindful of being charged as war criminals, the Germans backed down.

    The moral code never changes, but the particulars do. Curtis Lemay is not generally thought of as a moral philosopher, but he's the one who said, "There's a reason for the rules. The reasons are important; the rules are not." The reason for a moral code is to promote loving relationships. Sometimes the rules bend to accommodate that truth.

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