Navel-gazing, Descartes, and Evangelism

After a philosophical discussion in church today with Lee Dise, I turned back in my old books to the writings of Rene Descartes. When I was taking a philosophy class, we read some of his works, including Meditations on First Philosophy in which he makes his "I think, therefore, I am" or "cogito, ergo sum" argument; an argument in search of certainty, not so much for himself, but for those who do not believe in God. In the Meditations, he finds certainty, first, in his own existence, and then from there in the things of this world and God himself. From the passage below, you will see that this is not navel-gazing: Descartes was certain of God's existence, but he wanted to develop an argument through philosophy, so that "infidels" could be certain, too.



When we think of philosophers, we often picture the atheists of today who strain language and logic to deny the existence of the Christian God. As I looked back at my notes, I observed - once again - that Descartes was not of this ilk. The passages from the opening of Meditations reflect a man of deep faith, trying to figure out how to share that faith with a fallen world.

I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be demonstrated by philosophical rather than theological argument. For although it is quite enough for us faithful ones to accept by means of faith the fact that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it certainly does not seem possible ever to persuade infidels of any religion, indeed, we may almost say, of any moral virtue, unless, to begin with, we prove these two facts by means of the natural reason. And inasmuch as often in this life greater rewards are offered for vice than for virtue, few people would prefer the right to the useful, were they restrained neither by the fear of God nor the expectation of another life; and although it is absolutely true that we must believe that there is a God, because we are so taught in the Holy Scriptures, and, on the other hand, that we must believe the Holy Scriptures because they come from God (the reason of this is, that, faith being a gift of God, He who gives the grace to cause us to believe other things can likewise give it to cause us to believe that He exists), we nevertheless could not place this argument before infidels, who might accuse us of reasoning in a circle. And, in truth, I have noticed that you, along with all the theologians, did not only affirm that the existence of God may be proved by the natural reason, but also that it may be inferred from the Holy Scriptures, that knowledge about Him is much clearer than that which we have of many created things, and, as a matter of fact, is so easy to acquire, that those who have it not are culpable in their ignorance. This indeed appears from the Wisdom of Solomon, chapter xiii., where it is said “How be it they are not to be excused; for if their understanding was so great that they could discern the world and the creatures, why did they not rather find out the Lord thereof?” and in Romans, chapter i., it is said that they are “without excuse”; and again in the same place, by these words “that which may be known of God is manifest in them,” it seems as through we were shown that all that which can be known of God may be made manifest by means which are not derived from anywhere but from ourselves, and from the simple consideration of the nature of our minds. Hence I thought it not beside my purpose to inquire how this is so, and how God may be more easily and certainly known than the things of the world.

To God be the glory.